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Securitisation of urban electricity supply 
A political ecology perspective on the cases of Jordan and 
Lebanon 
Eric Verdeil 
Abstract: Questions about urban infrastructure, resilience, and violence are 
central to current urban general literature since infrastructures function as 
locations of conflict and negotiation over the public good, inclusion and exclusion, 
and mobility in the city. This chapter develops a theoretical framework to 
analyse the emergence of new concerns for urban energy security in the cities of 
Amman (Jordan) and Jbeil and Zahleh (Lebanon). Supplying these cities with 
electricity requires creating new circuits that are both material and sociopolitical. 
In Amman, one of the projects proposed for coping with the projected growth of 
energy demand was to build a nuclear plant in the “desert” close to Amman. This 
project, now allegedly in the final studies stage, has experienced many episodes 
and delays. Analysis shows the pressure of urban energy demand and the 
resizing of metabolic circuits at the level of the metropolis of Amman, while the 
governance of these circuits remains state-driven despite popular protests. In 
Jbeil and Zahleh, in the face of regular and long-lasting power cuts, local 
capitalist actors have taken the lead to provide an alternative electricity supply 
that replaces both the national grid and informal generators that are in use 
elsewhere in the country. At f irst glance, both situations seem very different in 
scale and in the type of actors involved. But in both cases, these new circuits are 
heavily contested and redistribute agencies of power in ways that empower 
some actors but that, at the same time, erode solidarity at the city and the 
national levels. 
Middle Eastern cities, like many cities on comparable development paths, are 
currently experiencing problems with supplying energy, specifically with 
supplying electricity. This is best illustrated by the power cuts that many such 
cities undergo, whether they are regular and planned, as in Lebanon or Iraq, or 
unpredictable, such as the sudden blackout in Tunis on 1 September 2014. In 
response to this situation, cities – and citizens – have developed a broad range 
of coping strategies to alleviate the resulting difficulties. Demographic growth 
and new energy consumption patterns are exacerbating what is experienced 
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and described on the ground as an energy crisis. As a consequence, the 
security of urban electricity supplies has become a new mantra. 
This focus on urban energy problems represents a turnaround from the priority 
once given to rural electrification and the objective of nationwide access to 
electricity. While these efforts continue, a new imagination of energy threats 
has prompted a shift in geographical priorities and the introduction of policies 
designed to securitise energy supplies. What this essentially means is the 
resurgence of the state in the realm of energy policy, after decades of 
liberalisation and market rhetoric (Bridge, 2015). This policy turn reflects the 
emergence of new pressures, including fears concerning peak oil, increases in 
global energy prices, and threats to transport infrastructures. These threats 
can be ecological (e.g., Hurricane Katrina, which disrupted vital energy 
infrastructures supplying US cities) or geopolitical, with the deliberate targeting 
of energy routes, as has happened in relations between Russia and Ukraine or 
in recent Middle Eastern conflicts (Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Israel). Despite the 
recent popularity of energy security in policy circles, scholars criticise the 
notion as lacking precision. It can indeed cover many different ideas and vary 
widely in scope. From a geographical perspective, it is usually applied to 
relations between states and hence obfuscates or conceals other possible 
spatial relations, such as those between cities and areas inside or outside their 
national borders (Bridge, 2015). 
This chapter explores this complex but neglected geography of energy policies 
(Bridge et al., 2013; Pasqualetti and Brown, 2014; Sovacool, 2014). It argues 
that concerns about urban energy security are moving into the political 
agendas of both national and local governments, a trend that in the case of 
global cities has begun to receive scholarly attention. Hodson and Marvin have 
shown how the notion of urban ecological security can provide insight into the 
unfolding of a diverse range of policies and commitments in a number of global 
cities, such as London or San Francisco. These policies reflect concerns over 
energy security – linked with the protection of vital infrastructures and with 
new capitalist development strategies – shared by coalitions of metropolitan 
elites that encompass municipal authorities and multinational companies 
based in such cities (Hodson and Marvin, 2010). This is taking place at a time 
when certain global cities are increasingly autonomous vis-à-vis states. 
The situation of Middle Eastern cities is starkly different from that of these so-
called global cities, providing an opportunity for research into two sets of 
factors that merit a more critical approach than is apparent in the dominant 
conversation. This chapter makes the twofold argument that the emergence of 
energy security concerns at the level of cities (1) is not driven by the transition 
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to low carbon energies and (2) raises and unpacks sharply contrasting political 
claims about the future of cities and nations. 
A widely accepted understanding of urban energy transition sees it as a 
commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and developing low carbon 
technologies, in the belief that urban energy consumption is a major 
contributor to reducing the unwanted effects of climate change (Bulkeley et al., 
2010). However, this approach is too normative and can be misleading 
(Rutherford and Coutard, 2014), especially as applied to cities in emerging 
economies (Jaglin and Verdeil, 2017). It tends to mask other factors that drive 
energy policies at the urban level, including ecological concerns for the local 
environment and economic motives. Because of these local conditions, policy 
choices may not prioritise low carbon solutions but instead focus on 
(sometimes large) thermal generation technologies, as in the cases examined in 
this chapter. The argument here is that in most Middle Eastern cities, low 
carbon transition strategies are not priorities for national and local 
governments in their efforts to tackle energy challenges, specifically energy 
security. 
Another key point highlighted by Middle Eastern cities is the increasing level of 
politicisation around energy issues. In most cities in the region, local 
authorities remain under the tight control of state authorities (United Cities 
and Local Governments, 2008), a legacy of colonial centralisation and of 
authoritarian rule. In the Middle East, energy remains the domain of national 
sovereignty par excellence. However, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, it has 
become a powerful issue at the urban level, prompting citizen mobilisation 
(Lakhal, 2014; Verdeil, 2014c). Street protests have occurred in opposition to 
tariff increases or in support of a right to light, in contexts where frequent 
power cuts disrupt urban living patterns that have become dependent on 
modern technologies. These claims (which are not typical to the region (Luque-
Ayala and Silver, 2016)) are to be understood in a context where neo-liberal 
policies have eroded the social contract that had linked states and citizens over 
years of development strategies. The promise of (rather than real access to) 
infrastructure – the so-called modern infrastructural ideal – was central to this 
political trade-off (Chanson-Jabeur et al., 2001; Graham and Marvin, 2001). 
In sum, the objective of this chapter is to identify and characterise urban 
energy security strategies in Middle Eastern cities by highlighting two facets – 
one pertaining to governance, political economy, and politics and the other 
focusing on the material and technical choices made – and to connect them to 
political issues, in an approach inspired by urban political ecology. The 
analysis will draw on two case studies that help to unpack the diverse 
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configurations of urban energy security and the different levels of importance 
in the already-mentioned factors. 
An Urban Political Ecology Framework to Understand Energy Securitization 
There are numerous definitions of the notion of energy security and a 
multiplicity of energy securitisation policies. The analytical lens provided by 
urban political ecology helps to frame them in a productive way for the purpose 
of this chapter. Sovacool (2013) has identified around forty-five different ways 
to define energy security, sometimes mutually contradictory or misleading. For 
instance, the International Energy Agency defines energy security as “the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA, (n.d.). 
This definition combines an infrastructural and an economic dimension and 
emphasises distribution. However, the nature of energy insecurity is greatly 
affected by the materiality of the energy source. In the case of oil – and 
excluding black swan events – energy security is essentially about the variation 
of prices on international markets, whereas “The concern for physical 
unavailability of supply is more prevalent in energy markets where 
transmission systems must be kept in constant balance, such as electricity 
and, to some extent, natural gas” (ibid.). This unavailability is related either to 
net-import dependence or to the “political stability of suppliers”. Energy 
security as defined by the International Energy Agency (IEA) appears to be 
multifaceted but is highly contingent on specific energy forms and on specific 
institutional and geopolitical contexts, but the IEA definition tends to overlook 
the links between these facets. For instance, disruption of natural gas imports 
(through either interruption or price hikes) drastically alters the way electricity 
is generated and its affordability. The definition also tends to limit the its 
relevance to the realm of international – and more precisely, interstate – 
relations. However, as Gavin Bridge has noted, the increasing number of 
policies that incorporate energy security “not only change the objects and 
subjects of securitisation but also introduce alternative territorialities to those 
of the state while also problematising relations among different organisational 
scales” (Bridge, 2015). 
In contrast to definitions of this kind, this chapter adopts an urban political 
ecology approach that acknowledges how energy (in)security arises along the 
chain linking energy forms at their different stages: extraction, transport, 
conversion, transport (again), and consumption. Urban political ecology focuses 
on the circulation of natural flows through space as they merge with flows of 
capital and power, in order to understand how the city is produced: the 
“enabling and disabling social and environmental conditions” of the city 
(Heynen, Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2006; Swyngedouw, 2006; Monstadt, 2009: 
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10). Thus, as Timothy Mitchell suggests, understanding energy (in)security 
entails the need to “follow closely a set of connections that were engineered . . . 
between carbon fuels and certain kinds of democratic and undemocratic 
politics” (Mitchell, 2011: 252–253). In addition to this political ecology 
perspective, Mitchell’s specific insight is to highlight the vulnerability of these 
circuits, specifically at the spatial connections that allow them to work. Since 
this vulnerability – and hence (in)security – is politically produced, Mitchell is 
able to identify strategies of securitisation/disruption around these vulnerable 
spatial connections. Securitising energy circulation involves the building of 
territorially based alliances, making it necessary to examine the political and 
social exchanges that fuel these alliances, such as patronage relationships. 
Another contribution of urban political ecology is its relational understanding 
of the city. Instead of a “bounded and scaled” space, the city is best understood 
as a node (or a complex of nodes) interweaving various flows and power 
relations that run across scales and political boundaries (Swyngedouw, 2006). 
Because research on energy security needs to make sense of “alternative 
geographies” (Bridge, 2015) to the state, this relational approach allows us to 
consider the cross-level negotiations and coproduction of security policies by 
the state and, this chapter contends, by metropolitan authorities and economic 
elites. 
With these two principles in mind, the empirical analysis can be framed by 
looking at a number of publications that have begun to trace the issues and 
policies pertaining to urban energy security. The paradigm of “urban ecological 
security”, as identified by Hodson and Marvin (2009; 2010), points to the 
emergence of “strategies to reconfigure cities and their infrastructures in ways 
that help to secure their ecological and material reproduction” (Hodson and 
Marvin, 2009: 194). For the authors, the emergence of these strategies is linked 
to two related processes. The first is the increasing “ecological pressures” that 
cities face and that are disrupting vital sectors of the economy, including 
energy. The second is the growing autonomy of global cities vis-à-vis the state 
in a neo-liberal economy, with increased economic competition between cities 
in a context of neo-liberal policy shifts that empower major metropolises (cf. 
also: Brenner, 2004). The coalition of interests that speaks on behalf of cities – 
that is, metropolitan authorities, business representatives, and NGOs – not 
only values the “continued connection of intra and interurban infrastructure” 
to protect the economy but also seeks to take advantage of the “eco-competitive 
race” that is “[r]ecasting . . . the neoliberal competition” (Hodson and Marvin, 
2010: 98). 
Hodson and Marvin identified a series of policies within which these strategies 
are implemented. Particularly relevant to our argument is the “decoupling from 
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national infrastructure and circuits and the downsizing of circuits” (Hodson 
and Marvin, 2010: 105). Decoupling from national infrastructure provides a 
safeguard from remote events that could potentially threaten natural resources 
supply to cities – for instance, the disruption of energy circuits. To alleviate 
such threats, major energy circuits are strategically relocated through the 
diversification of energy supplies to sources that are potentially less vulnerable 
or that are locally available and that can be harnessed by new technologies. 
These are typically low-carbon and renewable energy solutions. In addition (or 
as a corollary) to this, another response is the downsizing of circuits. The 
construction of shorter, closed loops and the quest for autonomy or even 
autarchy in various ecological resources are part of this framework for making 
cities more resilient to sudden changes affecting the supply of resources. 
The body of research spearheaded by Coutard and Rutherford around the issue 
of post-networked cities also offers interesting insights for framing the problem 
of securing resource flows (Coutard and Rutherford, 2016). Specifically, they 
direct attention to the articulation of the new geometries (autarchy vs 
autonomy) arising from the reconfiguration of circuits (closing loops, 
rebundling) on regional and urban scales and to the governance of these 
infrastructures (on a continuum from individual to collective decision-making) 
(Coutard and Rutherford, 2010). Interestingly, while autonomy or autarchy can 
protect cities from disruptive events, disconnection from larger networks can 
under certain circumstances conversely expose a city or collective to local 
infrastructure disruption without backup from the larger network. Autarchy 
signals the end of the solidarity once promised by the modern infrastructural 
ideal. 
To what extent are these topics of investigation relevant to the energy security 
of Middle Eastern cities, where the political, economic, and infrastructural 
parameters that condition energy choices and usage differ greatly from those of 
the global or European cities on which these authors focus? Our case studies 
feature cities characterised both by strong state dominance in urban 
governance (hence little local political autonomy) and by smaller involvement in 
the world economy, making capitalist firms less likely to use them as 
laboratories of a new, green capitalism. The question here is whether ordinary 
cities face similar energy challenges and, if so, how they tackle them. 
Table 17.1 summarises the variables that the analysis will consider in the light 
of these questions. Two main points are scrutinised: (1) the geographical and 
infrastructural reconfigurations of energy circuits, with a focus on the variables 
of scale, energy mix diversity, and geographical import diversification and (2) 
the governance of these circuits, within which the variables are the actors and 
organisations involved (public vs private, state or local authorities vs 
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international organisations, inhabitants vs decision makers) and their 
interrelations (political resources and the nature of political exchange, such as 
negotiations and hierarchical decisions). 
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Table 17.1 Issues examined and analytical variables 
Issue examined Variables under scrutiny 
Reconfiguration of 
energy circuits 
Scale (from regional to local) 
Diversification of energy technology and forms 
Diversification of energy routes 
Governance and the 
politics of energy 
circuit 
reconfiguration 
Actors and organisations involved (public/private, 
state/local/international, inhabitants/activist 
groups/decision makers) 
Type of political relations (negotiation, conflict, 
hierarchical decisions) 
 
In what follows, I examine the case of Amman in Jordan – more specifically the 
plan for the construction of a nuclear power plant near Amman – and the 
Lebanese cities of Zahleh and Jbeil, where the private firms in charge of 
electricity distribution are attempting to extend their activities to power 
generation and to craft energy autonomy while withdrawing from the disrupted 
national electricity grid, which has never fully recovered from the civil war. This 
chapter draws on information gathered over more than ten years of research on 
the transformation of the electricity sector in Lebanon. I personally carried out 
numerous interviews involving a variety of stakeholders (public and private 
utilities, the Ministry of Energy in Jordan, consultants, NGOs, and 
inhabitants), supervised several masters students, and carried out a regular 
press review (see also Verdeil, 2009; 2016). In the specific case of Amman, I 
have undertaken four field visits in the last six years, the most recent in 
October 2014, during which I was able to interview several activists (local and 
national) opposing the construction of the nuclear power plant. I conducted 
other interviews with representatives of government and public and private 
utilities and extensively consulted official and press documents gathered on-
site and online (Verdeil, 2014b). 
Amman (Jordan): towards a new urban ecology? 
The vigorous demographic and economic development of Jordan’s capital city, 
Amman, is triggering fast-growing demand for energy, specifically electricity 
(Mason, Al-Muhtaseb and Al-Widyan, 2009; Verdeil, 2014b; Ahmad, 2015). The 
country heavily depends (96 to 98 percent) on hydrocarbon imports from its 
neighbours, oil from Iraq until 2003, and natural gas from Egypt for electricity 
generation since 2002. Since 2011, however, the Jordanian authorities have 
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experienced a drop in the reliability of natural gas imports because of repeated 
bomb attacks by Islamist fighters on the pipeline carrying fuel from Egypt 
through the Sinai. This sudden disruption has forced them to buy heavy fuel 
on the international market at a time of booming prices. While this fix 
alleviated interruptions in the electric supply, it placed a heavy financial 
burden on the national utility NEPCO (National Electric Power Company) , 
which was not able to pass on the increased cost to customers. In the wave of 
revolt associated with the Arab Spring in neighbouring countries, the 
government was wary of any price increases that might fuel anger in the 
streets. It is only since 2013 that it has increased electricity tariffs, and even 
then for big customers only (Verdeil, 2014c). 
In a situation of energy crisis, the Jordanian authorities are therefore pursuing 
a strategy of energy diversification and geographical relocation (Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Energy, 2007). This includes the exploitation of 
oil shale for electricity generation (with a target of 14 percent of primary energy 
by 2020), the development of wind farms and solar power (10 percent by 2020), 
and new contracts for importing natural gas, either through a liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) terminal in Aqaba (imports from Qatar), through the construction of 
a new pipeline from Iraq, currently being commissioned or, as of 2014, through 
deliveries from Israel, a practice that is sharply contested. It also includes the 
project to build a nuclear power plant, under study since 2007, which was 
intended to supply 6 percent of primary energy by 2020.1 The purpose of this 
strategy is to reduce exposure to the impact of regional geopolitics on energy 
imports by locating electricity production within the country at an affordable 
cost. The following section of the chapter analyses the nuclear project in the 
light of the variables identified. 
The nuclear project in relation to Amman’s urban ecology 
Despite the fact that the Ministry of Energy planned the nuclear project in 
Jordan within the framework of a national energy strategy, the arguments put 
forward to justify the changes in the project highlight its special connection 
with the urban ecology of Amman and its region, from Madaba in the south to 
Zarqa in the north and to Salt in the west. First, it can be argued that the issue 
of Jordan’s energy security is above all about Amman’s energy security. 
Altogether, in 2011 – before the large-scale influx of Syrian refugees – the 
capital conurbation accounted for just under 50 percent of the population, with 
roughly three million inhabitants (Ababsa, 2013), while 70 percent of industry 
workers and 67 percent of skilled workers were in this area in 2006. Electricity 
consumption in the area covered by Jordanian Electric Power Company 
(JEPCO), the utility that holds the concession for the region, represents 61 
percent of national consumption. The geographical concentration of the 
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population and the economy in the capital city region explains the high 
demand for electricity. 
The nuclear power plant was initially to be located in Aqaba, in the south of the 
country, a place with access to the sea and therefore to the water needed to 
cool the reactors. In 2010, however, this initial site was abandoned. Several 
technical arguments were raised, such as the high cost of pumping seawater to 
the site (Ahmad, 2015) and the seismic risk, since Aqaba is located on a large 
earthquake fault. In addition, press reports also hinted that the countries 
neighbouring the Aqaba site, in particular Israel, had put pressure on the 
Jordanian government for fear that an accident to the plant might affect their 
territories (for a more detailed discussion of these arguments, see Verdeil, 
2014b). 
The Jordan nuclear authority then picked a new site, near the city of Balama, 
in the northern region of Mafraq, about 35 kilometres from Amman (Figure 
17.1). The proximity of the power plant to the central urban conurbation was a 
strong economic argument for the project, since it cut out the cost of 
reinforcing the high voltage line from Aqaba to Amman, a distance of about 400 
kilometres (Figure 17.2). Even the issue of cooling for the plant, in principle a 
big problem in the world’s fourth driest country, has been turned into a plus. 
Inspired by the example of the Palo Alto nuclear power plant in the United 
States, the Jordanian Atomic Energy Commission plans to use Amman’s 
wastewater, treated at the Khirbet el-Samra plant in the north-east of the 
conurbation, to cool the reactors. 
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Figure 17.1 Geography of the nuclear project near Amman. 
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Figure 17.2 The high-voltage electricity line in the desert between Amman and 
Aqaba. Building a nuclear power plant near the sea would have implied the 
doubling of this line over some 400 kilometres, a huge investment. 
Author, 2010 
The geographical and material arguments advanced by the government and the 
nuclear commission to justify the nuclear plant project near Amman are not 
confined to fixing Jordan’s dependency on other countries in the light of the 
turbulent geopolitical environment, though this is obviously a strong 
motivation, as evidenced by the other strands of the diversification strategy. At 
a minimum, the relocation is rooted in the idea of decoupling Jordan’s energy 
supply from regional circuits. The project’s location also appears to be part of a 
strategy that favours not only urban proximity and hence the “downsizing” of 
the energy circuits but also a sort of metabolic rebundling through the use of 
the city’s grey water. The strategy therefore shows unexpected similarities with 
the policies of “post-networked cities” that are being implemented in green 
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cities, which usually don't take nuclear energy into consideration (Coutard and 
Rutherford, 2010). 
Indeed, the project has sparked technical and financial controversy among 
experts and international agencies. In March 2012, after a competitive bidding 
process, the government announced that it had chosen the Russian firm 
Rosatom to develop the project. The Russians offered to develop the power 
plant as a Build Operate and Own project and committed itself to funding 49.9 
percent of an investment estimated at US$10 billion. A first criticism of the 
project was its economic cost. Several analysts wondered if the Jordanian 
government would be able to secure the large amount of money required for the 
investment at a time when the country was running an unprecedented deficit 
(93 percent of GDP in 2015) (Ahmad, 2015; Gamba, 2015; Magid, 2016). The 
same question was raised about the Russian firm’s capacity to fund such a 
large investment. More recent sources have mentioned the possible 
involvement of Chinese investors with a 35 percent stake, which is interpreted 
as a sign of significant funding problems (World Nuclear Association, 2016). 
Having made the choice to disentangle itself from the Middle East’s complex 
geopolitics, the Jordanian government has become dependent on a technology 
that is largely out of its hands in terms of expertise and that entails significant 
external financial support that might erode its sovereignty in another way. 
The second category of arguments against the project is more technical and 
casts doubt on the possibility of developing such a big nuclear project in such 
a small country (Ahmad, 2015; for a detailed analysis, see Ramana and 
Ahmad, 2016). The project entails the construction of two 1060 MW reactors, 
which would represent about 30 percent of the country’s total generating 
capacity. In the event of planned – or, even worse, unplanned – outages, the 
stability of the grid might be severely affected. The project’s backers claim that 
Jordan would become a net exporter of electricity to neighbouring countries, 
but this would entail heavy investment in reinforcing interconnections, which 
are currently inadequate. Another strategy would have been to build smaller 
reactors, more appropriate for a small grid. These technical criticisms directly 
challenge the scale of the project. Whatever the fate of this intriguing nuclear 
project in Jordan, its existence and the debate on the issue of scale and the 
reconfiguration of ecological and energy circuits demonstrate that even when 
renewable energy is not at stake, energy systems may move beyond state 
territories in their scale and geographical organisation. 
Local politics versus centralised governance 
Though the project is directly linked with the ecology of the Jordanian capital, 
its governance remains fairly centralised. Not only are the municipal 
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authorities out of the loop, but local protest movements against the project 
have been circumscribed by central state institutions. 
Once the population of Balama, located between the Khirbet el Samra water 
treatment plant and the city of Mafraq, got wind of the project, a strong 
popular movement grew, both locally and in the capital, where several 
demonstrations took place in 2011 and 2012 (Verdeil, 2014b). The place was 
on the tribal lands of the Bani Hasan, a powerful tribe in Jordan, though its 
members not only live in the original villages where their ancestors used to 
herd camels and shee, but have also settled in cities. The protest movement 
was mostly concerned with issues of safety and accident risk, as well as with 
the expropriation of some of their tribal pastures. The protest gained 
momentum on the streets and on social networks, and under the name 
Irhamuna (“Mercy for us”), it was able to attract support well beyond its 
constituency, notably from local and international NGOs. In the wake of the 
Fukushima Daishi accident, Greenpeace drew the attention of the international 
media by demonstrating, disguised as nuclear workers, in front of the Ministry 
of Energy. Local environmentalist NGOs, wary of being labelled as allies of such 
international organisations, and therefore not willing to cooperate with them, 
published op-eds in the press, and lobbied parliamentarians, ministers, and 
public figures. They soon gained strong backing, with several nuclear 
scientists, former energy administrators, and even a daughter of the king 
taking a firm stand against the project. 
In March 2012, Parliament voted against the construction of a nuclear power 
plant in Jordan, but the decision had no binding force. In October 2013, the 
government and the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) announced the 
move to a new site: Qasr Amra, 62 kilometres from Amman and about 20 
kilometres from the oasis of Azraq, in the desert east of the capital. This more 
remote region is home to the Bani Sakher tribe, who in turn were quick to 
mobilise against the project. Despite employing similar strategies, however, 
they failed to achieve the same results (at the time of writing). This can be 
explained by the government’s capacity to overcome its main and most 
influential opponents and by its strong commitment to what was deemed a 
royal project. 
From its beginnings in 2007, the nuclear project was directly backed by the 
king as a national priority. In 2010, he reacted to discreet pressure to move the 
project from Aqaba by strongly reasserting the country’s right to develop a civil 
nuclear programme. The Jordanian government created two new bodies 
dedicated to the project, JAEC – in charge of commissioning studies – and the 
Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which having later merged into the 
Jordan Energy and Minerals Regulatory Commission, was responsible for 
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regulating the sector. The nuclear projects also include a small experimental 
reactor, currently under construction at the Jordan University of Sciences and 
Technology, and training for technicians and engineers through international 
cooperation agreements with more than ten nuclear countries. This strong 
commitment to nuclear energy explains how the government dealt with the 
popular protests and the distinct fates of the two protest movements. 
The protest in Balama occurred at a tough time for the government. Between 
2011 and 2012, the king fired three prime ministers in a climate of widespread 
protest against rising living costs, energy prices, and corruption among 
members of the political and business elites. At times, the king himself was 
targeted (Abu-Rish, 2014). The political context helps to explain the 
government’s strategy to defuse the tension around the nuclear project and to 
prevent it snowballing into other protests. In addition to this, the president of 
Parliament, himself a member of the Bani Hassan tribe, is said to have spoken 
personally to the king to urge a change of location.2 Trade-offs at the highest 
level of the state thus explain the relocation of the project. 
Conversely, in Qasr Amra, despite edgy demonstrations and political outrage in 
Parliament led by Member of Parliament Hind al Fayez, herself from the Bani 
Sakher tribe and a representative of the Azraq region, the movement lost 
momentum. Several political representatives once prominent in the protest 
movement were, according to Hind el Fayez, persuaded to change their minds 
after being granted personal advantages for themselves and their families, such 
as jobs in Parliament and the public administration. The tactics thus adopted 
to disempower the local protest movements reveal a high level of centralisation 
in decision-making. They show how a material and technological organisation 
that seeks to reconfigure energy and ecological circuits at the city level is 
governed by centralised mechanisms that leave little space for local 
deliberation. 
Zahleh and Jbeil (Lebanon): securing electricity supplies by withdrawing 
from the national grid? 
Since the civil war, Lebanon has never overcome the profound disruption in its 
electricity supply. Despite improvements during the reconstruction period from 
1991 to 2006, load sheddings continued at a minimum rate of three hours a 
day. Following the Israeli-Hizbollah war of 2006, the situation deteriorated as a 
result of bomb damage to infrastructures, combined with a lack of investment 
in maintenance and in the expansion of the grid and of generating capacity, 
attributable to major disagreements between political groups, specifically over 
the issue of reform in the electricity sector (Khodr and Uherova Hasbani, 2013). 
Privatisation projects and other institutional reorganisations of the national 
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utility Electricité du Liban (EDL) stalled in the face of persistent practices of 
employment patronage and non-payment of bills, together with hookups and 
other forms of illegal access to power (Verdeil, 2009; Mandarino, 2016). In 
addition, geopolitics have also played a part: while the new capacity developed 
in the late 1990s was designed for natural gas, a cheaper energy source, the 
pipeline from Syria, was not completed until 2009. 
However, the long-awaited supply of natural gas from Syria or from Egypt via 
the Arab gas pipeline was also disrupted by revolt in Egypt, by the bombing of 
the pipeline in the Sinai, and by internal war in Syria. Prospects of gas drilling 
in the Mediterranean, which could become a game changer, have so far been 
delayed by the lack of consensus between the political elites (Leenders, 2016). 
As a result, load shedding has dramatically increased. While the capital comes 
off relatively lightly, with only three hours of power cuts a day, other places 
experience outages of twelve or fourteen hours. However, in Lebanon even more 
than in Jordan, electricity is just as central to urban life (light, fridges, TVs, 
high-rises with lifts, air conditioning, and Internet) as it is in many other 
middle-income countries. 
Faced with the unreliability of the main network, the Lebanese have developed 
in the last thirty years or so backup solutions, notably small private 
generators. Over time, this alternative grid has pervaded Lebanese cities, 
covering them with a secondary power grid that is deeply embedded in the 
spaces and practices of everyday life (Gabillet, 2010; Verdeil, 2016). It is 
estimated that 70 percent of households rely on this fix (LCEC, 2014), even 
though it is an expensive solution (World Bank, 2009). Commercial 
subscriptions to generators are illegal, since they break EDL’s monopoly. 
However, in practice, they are tolerated and even regulated by municipalities, 
which own the poles used by the private grids and which , as the body 
accountable for health issues, may also control the location of the noisy and 
polluting devices. Lebanon’s Ministry of Energy even began to publish a 
monthly price index so that municipalities could monitor the prices charged by 
generator owners (Gabillet, 2010), a response by the public authorities to 
citizens’ demand for protection. However, this is not so much a securitisation of 
the power supply as a fragile attempt to regulate a service whose 
implementation remains in the hands of private actors. On the other hand, the 
cases of Jbeil and Zahleh differ from the situation prevalent in other Lebanese 
localities. 
Zahleh, the main city of the Beqaa region, and fifteen neighbouring 
municipalities, together have a population of around 250 thousand. Jbeil, also 
known as Byblos, is a tourist and service town on the northern edge of the 
metropolis of Beirut, with around forty thousand inhabitants. In both cities, 
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private companies are in charge of electricity distribution (Electricity of Zahleh, 
and Electricity of Jbeil – usually called by their French acronym EDZ and EDJ, 
or in Arabic, Kahraba Zahleh and Kahraba Jbeil). This situation dates back to 
the French mandate, which awarded concessions to private entrepreneurs. 
While the concessions in other parts of the country have gradually reverted to 
the state, the families running these businesses have managed to keep their 
licences. In the last twenty years, they have even modernised the service and 
now claim the right to generate their own electricity to fulfil a need that the 
state is no longer able to meet. 
Material disentanglement from larger networks 
In the Lebanese context, what is distinctive in the struggle of the two electricity 
utilities is not only their attempt to withdraw from the national electricity grid 
and its daily load shedding but also their desire to eradicate the small 
neighbourhood and building-level self-generation and distribution initiatives 
and thus to establish a new geometry to achieve autonomy, if not autarchy. 
Currently, both EDJ and EDZ distribute the power supplied by EDL to their 
subscribers for about half the day. In their view, there is no hope of 
improvement: “EDL is not capable of ensuring 24 h year round supply to EDZ. 
. . . EDL has proven its inability to cope with a growing demand” (EDZ 
summary, 2016). Dependency on the national grid has become a threat to the 
future of the cities. But reliance on generators was also deceptive, because the 
service they offered was expensive and unhealthy and caused damage to the 
network without commercial accountability. Until 2005 and 2015 respectively, 
customers had no alternative for the remaining time other than to subscribe to 
a private provider or invest in their own generator, as everywhere in Lebanon. 
In 2005, however, the newly elected mayor of Jbeil cited the chaotic and 
dangerous private web of entangled wires overrunning the streets as the reason 
for a new initiative. He prohibited the existing providers from using the poles 
and invited EDJ to replace them with a more professional network of cables 
and generators. Technically, the two networks remained separate. By 2009, the 
size and quality of the backup generating infrastructure had improved in 
comparison with the preexisting situation, but it was still decentralised, with 
thirty-five units scattered in twenty-seven points across the city’s districts (for 
a detailed account, see Gabillet, 2010) (Figure 17.3). The neutral wires were 
rebundled into the main grid, showing that the alternative system was not fully 
self-sufficient. Although the generator grid was officially operated by a separate 
company, it shared the parent company’s workforce and resources, thereby 
optimising maintenance costs. 
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Figure 17.3 A fenced generating unit belonging to EDJ, and a pole in the grid 
managed by the same company. 
Photo by Eric Verdeil, 2015 
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It was not until 2015 that EDZ took a similar initiative. The company had 
invested heavily in grid modernisation and expansion in the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 2000s, in response to the region’s strong demographic growth. Its 
performance in the management of bill collection and illegal connections was 
outstanding,3 but as in Jbeil, increased load shedding reduced the profitability 
of these investments. In 2015, EDZ made the decision to install its own 
centralised generation infrastructure: it now rents a set of generation units 
producing a total output of 65 MW from the British company AGGREKO, a 
world leader in the kind of temporary power supply used, for example, at the 
London Olympic Games. After years of argument about the damage inflicted on 
the grid, the generator owners operating in the area were evicted. In contrast 
with Jbeil, network operation is centralised, but regardless of the minor 
differences between the two cases, the result is that both concessions now 
provide a 24/7 electricity supply through a combination of public grid supply 
and their own generation, although people still experience the daily shifts from 
one provider to next. 
Both companies have plans to achieve full decentralisation of power production 
and distribution in their region. In 2015, EDJ joined forces with a number of 
financial partners to launch a new company, Byblos Advanced Energy, with a 
plan for building a 60 MW power plant in the area to supply the concession. 
The International Finance Corporation, the private arm of the World Bank, 
contributed to the study and promised its financial support if the project 
received government approval (Hage Boutros, 2015a; 2015c). In Zahleh, the 
director of EDZ had been backing a similar idea since 2005, as the government 
discussed privatising the electricity sector (Verdeil, 2009; Gabillet, 2010). Once 
such a law had been passed, allowing EDZ to secure an agreement, the 
company would invest in its own thermal power plant, claiming that it would 
generate savings through economies of scale. Contacts are underway with local 
and international lenders. In both cases, the utilities encourage customers to 
install photovoltaic panels and solar water heaters, but they explain that they 
themselves cannot rely on renewable energy sources because they need base 
load capacity, which these technologies cannot at present provide (interviews, 
September 2016). 
Political struggles over the future of electricity in Lebanese cities 
The relative autonomy in the public grid, with backup capacity directly run by 
local utilities and plans to achieve autarchy (i.e., full decentralisation of 
production and distribution, or self-sufficiency), fuelled and continues to fuel 
heated political conflict at the local and national levels. Indeed, these future 
projects raise not only technical issues about the feasibility of quitting the 
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national grid but also political questions about the future of the nation, since 
electricity was conceived of as a symbol and instrument of national modernity 
and unity (Verdeil, 2009; 2016). 
The first phase of conflict involved local generator owners. In both cities, they 
were forcefully evicted from the stage, on the grounds that they encroached on 
the grid owned by the utility. Though the municipalities backed the move, the 
generator owners employed a variety of resistance tactics. In Jbeil, they had a 
degree of political support, which prompted EDJ to offer them the equivalent of 
one year of lost profits in compensation (Gabillet, 2010). In Zahleh, the 
generator owners put up physical resistance, shooting at transformers when 
their wires were cut. However, they lacked both popular and political support 
locally and are said to have withdrawn without compensation (interview, 
September 2016; Hage Boutros, 2015b). 
In both cases, the move towards electricity decentralisation has been driven by 
an alliance between local capitalist firms seeking to survive and develop a 
profitable service and local political forces which see a functioning power 
system as a source of legitimacy. In Jbeil and Zahleh, time is running short for 
the families that run the local utilities: the Zahleh licence expires in 2018 and 
the Jbeil licence in 2023. After this, if they are not renewed or renegotiated, 
their assets will fall into the hands of the state. Since the beginning of the 
2000s, they have been lobbying for privatisation of the sector and have 
proposed to invest in new electricity generation capacity. They have also 
invested (or tried to invest) in other government-launched electricity projects, 
such as bidding for contracts to manage power distribution in three regions 
(interviews, October 2016; for details on this project, see Verdeil, 2014a). A law 
on electricity privatisation passed by Parliament in April 2014 opened a new 
window of opportunity for advancing their aims, and after more than two years 
of political deadlock in the country, the election of a new president may bring a 
deal closer. 
The local notables in both cities are firmly behind their projects. In Jbeil, in 
addition to enjoying the support of the municipality, the owner of EDJ is part 
of a family that has interests in Byblos Bank, one of Lebanon’s biggest, and has 
many political and financial connections in Jbeil and nationally. For example, 
the main shareholder’s uncle was head of the Lebanese Banks Association 
(Gabillet, 2010). In Zahleh, the company’s management has also garnered the 
support of the mayor and the local members of Parliament and has diversified 
its political support outside the city. While the firm’s stakeholders are 
dominated by Christian families from a mostly Christian city, the company 
began in the early 2000s to hire Muslim employees – who now account for 
some 20 percent of the workforce – from the neighbouring municipalities. 
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During the 2006 war, EDZ carried out twenty-four-hour repairs to bombed 
transformer posts in Shia neighbourhoods, which also helped to secure the 
company wider support in the other parts of its operating zone. 
The rhetoric employed in this strategy of building broad local coalitions to back 
moves towards electricity decentralisation stresses the efficiency of the private 
sector and its ability to outperform the public utility (e.g., the EDZ 
advertisement touting the company’s ability to light up “our country” (watanna) 
(Figure 17.4). They enjoy the support of international organisations that for 
years have been pushing for reform of the electricity sector and have acted as 
advisers on these projects (World Bank, 2008; 2013). More than this, however, 
both companies play on what could be termed “local nationalism”, drawing on 
their rhetoric about the wide local consensus in favour of granting the 
companies the right to generate their own electricity, to pursue their 
distribution activities, and to argue for political decentralisation in the country. 
In Jbeil, for instance, EDZ subscribers would be able to bid for shares in the 
company that would own the new power plant. According to EDJ’s CEO, this 
would instil respect for the asset in the local population and prompt a 
readiness to pay, whereas state assets are an object of disdain. The new 
company could then become a model for all of Lebanon’s regions (interview, 
September 2016). 
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Figure 17.4 EDZ advertising its ability to light up the country.  
EDZ, circulated on Twitter, December 2, 2014: 
https://twitter.com/sharbelfaraj/status/539865236732653568 
Indeed, other regional leaders have expressed strong interest in these 
experiments. Sami Gemayel, heir to a leading family in the Metn area, north-
east of Beirut, has incorporated regional decentralisation into his party’s 
programme and has regularly cited the example of electricity (Hury, 2008). 
Several competing projects emulating those of Zahleh and Jbeil also emerged 
recently in the city of Tripoli (Hage Boutros, 2016). Local capitalist enterprises 
are thus piggybacking on aspirations for political decentralisation to promote 
their projects. 
However, they face doubt, incredulity, and resistance from many other 
interests, specifically inside the state electricity sector. For years, critics have 
contended that the concessions enjoy unfair advantages that allow them to 
make profits at the expense of the state (and of citizens) because of the low 
Eric Verdeil, ‘’Securitisation of Urban Electricity Supply. A political energy perspective on the cases of 
Jordan and Lebanon’’, in Haim Yacobi, Mansour Nsasara, eds., 2019, Routledge Handbook on Middle 
East Cities, p.246-264. Author’s version 
Page 23 of 31 
price at which they buy electricity from EDL. A representative from the Ministry 
of Energy considers the recent moves by EDZ and EDJ on electricity 
production to be illegal, since they infringe EDL’s production monopoly. For 
him, the state simply needs to wait for the licences to elapse in order to take 
possession of their assets (interview, October 2016). However, the energy 
minister has never attempted to terminate these popular initiatives. The 
national utility EDL, its management, and to an even greater extent its 
workforce have repeatedly made clear their opposition to any privatisation 
projects (Verdeil, 2009). The EDL union has publicly expressed its rejection of 
privatisation, and the day workers union, which represents the category of 
workers with the most to lose, has repeatedly gone on strike in recent years 
over the subcontracting of their work to private companies and in defence of a 
public utility (Mandarino, 2016). However, the privatisation bill passed by 
Parliament in 2014 is proof that many lawmakers do not share this position. 
There are therefore multiple divisions on this issue within the state and among 
the political elites. 
The electricity decentralisation projects in the cities of Zahleh and Jbeil also 
raise a number of other technical and political issues about the relations 
between the local and the national scales. By applying a national tariff, the 
state not only exercises sovereignty but also maintains social solidarity 
between small and large subscribers. The de facto subsidy policy pursued in 
Lebanon since the early 1990s, whereby prices do not rise in line with oil prices 
on the international markets, can also be viewed as a form of protection from 
external agencies. Unwilling to fund this kind of protective mechanism, EDZ 
has begun to charge additional fees to reflect the real cost of electricity 
generation for subscribers to its extended service. There is currently no 
discussion about tariffs under the future service, beyond the promise that it 
will cost less than customers pay with the current double-billing system 
(generator and EDL). The technical alliance between the potentially 
decentralised local perimeter and the national grid, to cover temporary supply 
failures from the new power plants, is another issue that is never mentioned in 
public debate around the current projects. In both cases, the technical and 
political articulation between the local and national levels remains opaque. 
Conclusion 
By focusing on the issue of securitisation of electricity supply in two Middle 
Eastern countries, this chapter has highlighted the links between state 
building and power supply and highlighted how the current geopolitics of the 
region, changes in the oil markets, and internal economic and political 
dynamics are testing these links and will perhaps lead to the establishment of 
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new ones. Table 17.2 summarises the result of the analysis. It highlights the 
diversity of urban energy security strategies, the opposition to them, and a 
number of common threads that stand out. 
Table 17.2 Energy Security Strategy 
Energy Security 
Strategy 
Decoupling from 
large networks and 
energy diversification 
Local politics of energy 
circuits 
Amman: nuclear 
plant 
construction 
project 
*National Energy 
Diversification and 
Independence 
Strategy 
*Towards 
technological and 
geopolitical 
dependence 
(Russia/China) 
*Downsizing of the 
metabolic loop 
(water/electricity) 
*Leading role of the state in 
designing the energy policy of 
the capital city region and 
marginalisation of local actors 
*Agency of local tribal actors 
dependent on their 
connections with the 
networks of the monarchy 
Zahleh/Jbeil: 
decentralisation 
of electricity 
generation and 
distribution 
*Disentanglement 
from the national 
grid 
*No energy 
diversification 
(almost no role for 
renewable energy) 
and dependence on 
international 
markets 
*National solidarity 
(technical and 
political) not 
considered 
*Local capitalist strategy 
exploiting aspirations to 
political decentralisation with 
the support of local political 
forces 
*Complicit tolerance or 
passive resistance of various 
state segments 
Whereas energy security is widely understood in terms of the state’s agency in 
seeking to protect its sovereignty, its population, and its economy, this chapter 
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has highlighted the emergence of alternative geographies of energy security. 
They involve new territorial scales, such as city regions or even fairly small 
urban entities, and – though not always – new actors, such as local capitalist 
and political elites in the Lebanese case. Energy needs or demands at these 
scales are imagined as autonomous vis-à-vis larger territories and networks. 
The specific resources of such territories are also perceived as advantages that 
can be exploited to achieve a partial rebundling of local circuits, as shown in 
Amman, stressing the potential for greater autonomy of local circuits. 
However, the main driver of this transformation is not the rise of renewable 
energy technologies, contrary to the assumptions implicit in discourses on 
energy transition (Dunsky, 2008). The types of energy targeted to support 
regional or urban rescaling in the examples analysed in this chapter – nuclear 
and thermal hydrocarbon-based electricity generation – are conventional, not 
to say old-fashioned. 
Larger scales are increasingly conceptualised as threats, or at least potentially 
unreliable, whereas national power grids were formerly engineered as a means 
of maintaining the security of supply through the pooling of diverse electricity 
sources, with regional projects such as the Arab gas pipeline designed to 
integrate and link Mashriq countries by means of infrastructure and 
commercial agreements. 
The emergence of subnational conceptions of energy security is directly linked 
to the weakening of the state. Lebanon is clearly a case in point. The technical 
demise of the state and its inability to reform its power sector and offer its 
population a continuous energy supply is an argument for electricity 
decentralisation. It also serves an agenda of greater local political autonomy, 
eroding the sovereignty of the state. In Jordan the nuclear power project is not 
associated with any subnational separatist or federalist venture. However, it 
symbolically highlights the almost unprecedented concentration of wealth and 
political power in the capital region, turning the peripheries, in particular the 
surrounding periphery, into disposable spaces which the capital city is free to 
use regardless of the claims and fears of some ordinary citizens. In addition, 
the project as conceived reveals the political and financial weakness of the 
state, which is obliged to place its sovereignty in the hands of foreign powers 
and of the forces of global capital, though in this case not Western but Russian 
and Chinese. 
To conclude, we need to recognise that these forthcoming transformations 
remain tentative and full of uncertainty*. However, even if these projects do not 
                                                                 
* As this chapter goes to print, the local situations have changed. In June 2018, the Jordanian government 
terminated the negotiations with Rosatom and gave-up with the project in Qasr al Hamra because of the 
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succeed or are significantly altered, the debates they raise illustrate profound 
changes in the infrastructural ecology of the cities, in the geographical 
dynamics that are reconfiguring Middle Eastern economies, and in the forces 
that challenge the state in the region. 
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